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in Canada. 
Introduction 
This paper will concentrate on severely defective newborns and 
their cluster of problems as well as the debate surrounding the ques-
tion of how to best care for these children. The issue has been selected 
as a priority issue because it has generated proposals which cut at the 
roots of a Christian view of man and poses challenges to Christian 
communities to move beyond ethical argument to a practical and 
socially obvious demonstration of the beliefs underpinning Christian 
ethical positions. 
Summary of the Discussion 
Contemporary medicine is the scene of an increasingly intense 
debate which centers on the issue of whether all severely defective 
newborn babies should be given equally vigorous treatment or whether 
some should be left radically untreated and allowed to die. This issue 
has generated more than a debate. Pediatric practice varies widely with 
respect to these babies. Many have been left untreated and allowed to 
die. Some, however, have lingered for extended periods of time. This 
situation has stimulated a series of pleas in favor of humanitarian 
infanticide. On a more theoretical level, speculation has begun on the 
doubtful human status of these infants. 
The debate has begun to move beyond the boundaries of medicine 
and medical ethics. It raises broader issues of a social, cultural and 
economic nature . This issue also promises to be at the center of a 
debate which could well surpass recent abortion debates with respect 
to the degree of polarization and acidic confrontation it generates. 
60 Linacre Quarterly 
/ 
'\ 
A Christian involvement in this debate and a Chistian concern with 
this issue must manifest itself on two interrelated levels. The level of 
informed, balanced, differentiated, comprehensive, and clear ethical 
argument is essential. However, a point in argument is reached when 
fundamental and fundamentally divergent beliefs and value choices are 
laid bare. At this point Christian ethical argument has to push forward 
to a living demonstration that defective newborns can indeed be given 
the care they require. 
This demonstration will certainly demand the imaginative creation 
of new ways of caring for those we cannot cure. It may also demand 
the creation of new communities, analogous to older religious orders, 
to dedicate themselves to meet crucial needs which surpass the compe-
tence and resources of existing social agencies. 
Christian belief and the ethical positions it supports demand incarna-
tion in societal activity which makes a cutting difference in the reality 
of how we care for the weak, the broken, and the incurable. Moral 
positions and ethical argument are impotent without this social 
incarnation. 
Each of these points now calls for a more extensive development. 
The preceding reflections summarize the argument this paper is 
designed to develop. 
Seriously Defective Newborns-
Selective Treatment, Nontreatment and Euthanasia: 
Our New Social Debate? 
In 1957, Glanville Williams, in his now famous book on The 
Sanctity at Lite and the Criminal Law, mentioned toward the end of 
his discussion of euthanasia that "the proposal to legalize humanitar-
ian infanticide is put forward from time to time by individuals." 1 An 
example of the reasoning behind such a proposal appears in Williams's 
quotation from Millard E. Everett's Ideals at Lite: "My personal 
feeling - and I don't. ask anyone to agree with me - is that eventually, 
when public opinion is prepared for it, no child shall be admitted into 
the society of the living who would be certain to suffer any social 
handicap - for example, any physical or mental defect that would 
prevent marriage or would make others tolerate his company only 
from a sense of mercy .... Life in early infancy is very close to non-
existence, and admitting a child into our society is almost like 
admitting one from potential to actual existence, and viewed in this 
way only normal life should be accepted." 3 
Williams follows this quotation and ends his book with the opinion 
that these proposals are few in number and "may at present be dis-
missed as politically insignificant." 3 
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There are many indications available that proposals for "humanitar-
ian infanticide" may no longer be simply dismissed as socially or polit-
ically insignificant. This is not to say that such proposals already enjoy 
wide public acceptability today. In fact, the general public is hardly 
extensively familiar with these proposals or with the medical situa-
tions which are inviting them. It takes time for society at large to 
become sufficiently familiar with an idea, to get sufficiently "used to" 
a new and different notion to permit its wide acceptablility. But 
societal attitudes change even with respect to very fundamental 
human values, sometimes in a very extensive and relatively rapid 
fashion, as our recent experience with abortion and prenatal diagnosis 
via amniocentesis cum fetal euthanasia readily demonstrates. 
In this respect it is significant that the idea of mercifully terminat-
ing the lives of seriously defective newborns is being considered in 
various fashions with increasing frequency today. The notion of infant 
euthanasia, in the active sense of deliberately terminating life, is 
already the center of a debate which is just beginning to gain 
momentum and capture the attention of the general pUblic. The 
professional and societal participants in this debate are bound to 
increase in number. 
Selective Nontreatment and Active Euthanasia? 
This debate over infant euthanasia will likely become more intense 
and rival, if not surpass, abortion as a focus of societal moral and legis-
lative concern. The debate over infant euthanasia in that active sense 
has arisen within the context of increasingly frequent parent-doctor 
decisions to withhold treatment from seriously defective newborns for 
conditions which would undoubtedly be treated in an otherwise 
normal infant, but which, if untreated, generally prove fatal. Selective 
non-treatment of seriously defective newborns, either on a case-to-case 
basis or as guided by a selection policy for definite categories of 
neo-natal defect, is motivated by a variety of judgments and value 
choices, but always accompanied by the hope and expectation that 
these babies will die quickly and painlessly. Often they do not. These 
babies not infrequently survive with varying subsequent life expec-
tancy and with greater physical and mental damage than would be the 
case had they been given immediate and vigorous treatment. 
This can and typically does happen in the case of children suffering 
from spina bifida with myelomeningocele. This situation has urged 
one pediatric neurosurgeon to raise the question of active euthanasia. 
"Active euthanasia might be the most humane course for the most 
severely affected infants whom you elect to treat, but it is illegal. ... I 
feel that a slow, 'natural' death over weeks, months or years is not 
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humane for the child, the family, or the staff forced to care for the 
infant. However, until active euthanasia, with whatever safeguards, 
becomes acceptable to society, I feel that vigorous treatment should 
be pursued for virtually every case." 4 
It is clear that nontreatment, especially the radical non treatment 
advocated by Dr. John Lorber over the past few years, 5 generally 
means death for the baby. However, death does not always come 
quickly. These babies very frequently linger for months or longer in 
many cases. So Dr. John Freeman asks, "Is there a right to die-
quickly?" and addresses the question to the medical profession and to 
the general public. 
The unoperated infant is being condemned to death, sooner or later, by 
less than optimal care - what might be termed passive euthanasia. The 
physician does not take into account the increased pain and suffering to 
both child and parent attendant to letting nature take its course. If we make 
that decision for a given child should we not then, as physicians, a lso have 
the opportunity to alleviate the pain and suffering by accelerating that 
death? This conversion from passive euthanasia to active euthanasia is not 
an easy one for society or for the individual physician faced with the deci· 
sions and their consequences. Having seen children with unoperated 
meningomyeloceles lie around the ward for weeks or months untreated, 
waiting to die, one cannot help but feel that the highest form of medical 
ethic would have been to end the pain and suffering rather than wishing that 
the patient would go away . 
It is time that society and medicine stopped perpetrating the fiction that 
withholding treatment is ethically different from terminating life. It is time 
that society began to discuss mechanisms by which we can alleviate the pain 
and suffering for those individuals whom we cannot help. 
People will ask: If we are to kill some children with meningomyeloceles, 
then where will we draw the line? At children with mongolism who may 
have a long, if impaired life? At children with muscular dystrophy who have 
a shorter life, but a number of normal years? At the severely retarded child? 
At the mildly retarded child? At the child with phycomelis, or with a con· 
genital amputation? There are areas where I do not believe euthanasia 
should be considered, but which physicians and society can and should 
discuss. However, in those rare instances where the decision has been made 
to avoid "heroic" measures and to allow "nature to take its course," should 
society not allow physicians to alleviate the pain and suffering and help 
nature takes its course - quickly? 6 
Dr. Freeman is of the opinion that active euthanasia should not be 
considered in the range of cases he mentions in question form, but 
only in those rare instances, where decisions have been made to avoid 
"heroic measures." However, the cases where much less than heroic 
measures have been waived to allow severely retarded children and 
children with Down's syndrome to die are not inconsiderable in 
number. Decisions for nontreatment - with death as a consequence -
of defective newborns, where the degree of defect varies considerably, 
are increasingly frequent. Moreover, the treatment in question is often 
of a quite routine surgical or medicational nature. Surgical correction 
of duodenal atresia is not considered to be an extraordinary or heroic 
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measure of medical treatment for an otherwise normal and healthy 
child. The same or similarly routine treatment has been withheld, with 
death as a consequence, in a number of published cases of children 
with Down's syndrome. 
The major point to be made here is that parent-doctor decisions for 
nontreatment of defective newborns with prolonged dying and death 
as a consequence, appear to be increasingly frequent and to manifest a 
trend toward passive euthanasia on the basis of quality of life prog-
noses for the infants in question. 
However, Dr. Freeman's questions and his passionate plea seem to 
reveal a "logic of the humane-thing-to-do" bridging passive euthanasia, 
the withholding of life-prolonging treatment, with active euthanasia, 
the deliberate hastening of defective infant death or the deliberate and 
immediate termination of defective infant life. 
Robert Reid has clearly expressed this logic in an article dealing 
with policies for selective nontreatment of newborns suffering from 
spina bifida with myelomeningocele. 
There is a blatant inconsistency in the attitudes of doctors who operate a 
policy of "selection." The whole aim of such a policy, and the hope of all 
those who are party to the decision to put that policy into operation, is that 
the child should be allowed to die quickly. Yet, having made this selection, 
the same doctors, along with the baby's parents, are prepared, or are forced, 
to stand back, take no further action, and watch the child take three, six, or 
sometimes as many as nine months to die. In the most unfortunate of 
circumstances the child will live on, either in an institution, or cared for by 
its paren ts. 
Most doctors would be prepared to guarantee that the effectiveness of 
pain· killing drugs and modern nursing care will remove any physical suffer· 
ings from the remaining days of life of the infant. The state of affairs is .. 
clearly ironical, and verges on the hypocritical. If a designated aim of 
medicine is that a child should die, why should it not be more humane to 
make it die? 
The question is not an unreasonable one .. . . For there is no doubt, if it is 
possible to arrive at acceptable criteria which can be reliably used to fulfill 
the hope that a spina bifida child will die, then the same criteria must be 
capable of being used to define a situation in which it can be ensured that 
the child does die. 7 
Criteria for Selecting Babies for Nontreatment 
Criteria for a selection of which defective newborns will be allowed 
to die and which will be optimally treated with the hope of prolonging 
their lives are at the heart of the debate over the seriously defective 
newborn. The criteria are proposed to bring some degree of rational 
control into a decision-making process which already shows signs of 
considerable inconsistency and arbitrariness. 
Many of these proposals involve criteria of a technical, medical 
nature. They are necessary if selective treatment decisions have to be 
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taken . One may seriously question, however, whether any list of 
objectively measurable criteria are a sufficient basis for life-death 
selection decisions. Robert Veatch has spoken of the "technical 
criteria fallacy." He has questioned the validity of a set of criteria 
which are used as automatic selective-decision dispensers. "It is not 
the precise content of the list which is important. Rather it is the 
concept that any list of objectively measurable criteria can be trans-
lated directly into decisions about selection for treatment and non-
treatment. Presumably the lists being proposed are meant to be 
reasonably accurate measures of prognoses. Yet the presumption that 
treatment or nontreatment rests solely on prognosis is surely contest-
able. The decision must also include evaluation of the meaning of 
existence with varying impairments. 8 
This "evaluation of the meaning of existence with varying impair-
ments" is a point where the debate over the seriously defective 
newborn has already entered its broader ethical and philosophical 
phase. We deal here with criteria proposals for selective nontreatment 
and for active euthanasia which are not immediately technical in char-
acter but involve estimates of what behavioral capacities are necessary 
for an infant to be judged human. The general public is already accus-
tomed to this kind of question as a result of the abortion discussions 
over the last years. A great number of people have grown accustomed 
to the idea or now hold that the fetus, at least up to a certain stage of 
development, is not human. Can a similar evolution of attitude be 
expected with respect to the seriously defective newborn? Were such 
an evolution of attitude to take place, would it not be a significant 
J' determinant of societal readiness for merciful infanticide? 
, 
What merits serious consideration with respect to the title question 
for this preamble is that euthanasia proposals are already being made 
or at least suggested as justifiable on the basis of a classification which 
relegates certain types of defective newborns into the category of the 
nonhuman. 
Registers of indicators, observable and measurable, have been 
established to facilitate and regulate the selection of defective 
newborns for optimal, vigorous treatment or for non treatment and 
death, as the case may be. Joseph Fletcher has already attempted a 
similar register of indicators of humanhood, a tentative profile of man. 
"Synthetic concepts such as human and man and person require 
operational terms, spelling out the which and what and when. Only in 
that way can we get down to cases - to normative decisions. There are 
always some people who prefer to be visceral and affective in their 
moral choices, with no desire to have any rational, critical reflection 
(encephalic and not merely visceral) about the problems of the moral 
agent - in biology and medicine as much as in law, government, i 
education or anything else. 
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"To that end, then, for the purpose of biomedical ethics, I am 
suggesting a 'profile of man' in concrete and discrete terms." 9 
One, of course, is perfectly justified in asking whether any set of 
discrete terms is capable of grasping and mapping the integrated 
reality we are attempting to indicate or express with synthetic 
concepts, such as man, human, person. Do these synthetic, integrated 
and systems concepts not perform a function which no array or 
summation of analytic and subsystems concepts is capable of doing? If 
it is possible, while being very encephalic and non visceral, to wonder 
whether "any list of objectively measurable criteria can be translated 
directly into decisions about selection for treatment and non treat-
ment," then it is equally mandatory to question whether any list of 
indicators can directly issue in judgments about the nonhumanhood of 
any being born into the human race. 
Nevertheless, ways are being suggested to arrive at such judgments. 
The purpose is presumably to facilitate decisions for selective non-
treatment, for allowing certain categories of defective infants to die, as 
well as decisions regarding the most humane way of managing these 
infants after the selection has been made. 
In June of 1977, the Anglican Church Task Force on Human 
Life in Winnipeg, Manitoba, produced an interim report, Considera-
tions Concerning the Passage from Life to Death. The report considers 
the newborn infant with severe neurological defects and raises the 
question as to whether certain categories of such infants are to be 
treated as human. 
An earlier section of the report discusses "What it means to be 
human." The discussion presents a range of opinions and concludes: . ' 
There is, however, a common thread in the forego ing comments. They all 
speak about man's ab ility to relate. The capability to relate to himself, with 
his neighbor, and with God encapsulates all the minimal criteria set down by 
theologians and scientists alike. It would follow, therefore, that without any 
of these criteria, actual or potential, a living body is not human. It is true 
that we are bound to emphasize the quality of another's life or to know 
completely their ability to relate. One can really distinguish, however, 
between human life and mere biological existence by using the foregoing 
cri teria. 10 
One of the many difficulties with this paragraph is that one does 
not have to go through the problematic exercise of labeling very defec-
tive babies as human or nonhuman to know what to decide about 
their treatment or nontreatment. Ethical and moral theological criteria 
have already been elaborated which cogently argue for the wisdom of 
withholding heroic and even ordinary treatment, for instance, surgical 
treatment when medical interventions of this kind will only fix the 
baby at a primitive stage of biological, neurological, psychological and 
human development. These nontreatm,ent decisions can be justified in 
carefully circumscribed situations without turning the curve into that 
arbitrary morass of human/nonhuman labeling. 
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Efforts at such distinctions are bound to produce only arbitrary 
norms and establish very dangerous precedents. These are arbitrary 
norms because "human" encompasses a complex developmental 
process and we really do not know what a defective baby 's future will 
be. There are arbitrary norms which are also unidimensional in char-
acter, because a baby, defective or not, is part of our reality, not just a 
physiological system with this or that chance of being salvaged. We, 
the entire human community surrounding the child, are part of this 
baby's reality; the baby, an integral part of ours. "Human" is not a 
discrete kind of label of the type we attach to objects and things. To 
say this particular baby is nonhuman is arbitrary and isolates the baby 
from the entire human community. 
Such isolation and the criteria upon which it is based set up very 
dangerous precedents. The criteria can be applied to many categories 
of persons suffering from severe trauma or deterioration, not just to 
severely defective newborns. When this label is applied, we are also 
affected. These persons no longer belong to us. We have changed. We 
are no longer the ones charged with their human care. We can behave 
toward them as though they were not human, because by hypothesis 
and by labeling, we have decided that they are not. But what happens 
to our humanity when we so behave? 
Two of the points just mentioned demand a moment's reflection. 
The Winnipeg document, mentioned above, draws the conclusion as 
to how we may, even should, behave toward severely defective new-
borns once we decide they are not human. 
J: The severely defective newborn infant which has no chance of gaining a 
modicum of spiritual or intellectual life deserves special consideration. The 
medical attendants may hope that the infant will contract some infection 
which, without treatment, will cause death, but if such a merciful outcome 
does not occur, the parents and society may acquire a sad burden for 20 or 
30 years. Nobody wants to assume the responsibility of taking direct action 
to end the infant's life because of the paralysis of thought which so easily 
immobilizes those who have to make life and death decisions about the 
infant. 
An infant with severe neurological defects may not be "human" as 
defined earlier in this paper and it is a fundamental enor to treat it as 
human. It is natural to trust what we see rather than what we know from 
the evidence of experience and medical science. We see that the creature 
looks like a human being and it was born of woman, though we know that it 
cannot possibly develop "humanhood." Our eyes carry the day and we treat 
the creature not only in a humane way but as if it were human. 
We are obligated to treat all sentient beings in a humane way, not causing 
them pain and, if they are in pain, endeavoring to relieve it. This obligation 
to treat animals humanely does not mean to most of us that we should treat 
them as if they were human. Our senses and emotions lead us into the grave 
mistake of treating human-looking shapes as if they were human although 
they lack the least vestige of human behavior and intellect. In fact the only 
, way to treat such defective infants humanely is not to treat them as 
human. 11 
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Without doubt, the severely defective newborn with no chance of 
gaining a modicum of spiritual or intellectual life deserves special 
consideration. But the above proposal is very clear: special considera-
tion in the circumstances means the desirability or justifiability of 
terminating such a baby's life, of killing such a baby. That kind of 
"special consideration" itself - frequently contemplated, let it be 
emphasized, beyond the boundaries of the particular document being 
quoted - deserves special consideration. 
One consideration will suffice for the moment. What could conceiv-
ably happen to the fragile web of our civilization if we decide that 
certain babies are not human and that we may kill them, humanely for 
their own sake, perhaps very selfishly for someone else's sake? 
What is at stake is whether the thin edge of the wedge of euthanasia will 
be a catastrophe or a civilizing influence for mankind. The argument, rein-
forced by the spectre of a Hitler, that the law will be abused by dictatorial 
monsters is easily dispensed with. Hitlers will abuse the spirit of the law 
whether it exists or not. What is more important is whether civilized people 
will be tempted to misinterpret the law and commit infanticide where it 
ought never to have been contemplated. 12 
This is a good point, but it comes too late. We must really ask 
whether infanticide should ever be contemplated, let alone per-
formed. If the answer is no, and we will briefly argue in favor of that 
negative below, then opting for infanticide and performing it with a 
rationale, not just out of desperation, will inevitably ask for further 
arbitrary extensions of this procedure. 
Quality of Life Judgments and Letting Babies Die 
Some newborn babies suffer from such serious neurological defects 
that one can have little hope for their survival and equally little hope 
of their developing beyond the physiological level of functioning they 
have already.. achieved. Such is the case with an anencephalic child. 
However, many other babies are born with very serious defects, yet 
have chances of reaching levels of development which will permit 
them to give and receive love, even to take their own lives into their 
own hands, often to a very significant degree. This is the case with 
many Down's syndrome babies and with babies suffering from spina 
bifida with myelomeningocele. Of course, to reach these levels of I 
development these babies will require extensive and complex medical 
treatment. Decisions are now being regularly made to withhold such 
treatment and let the babies die. Indeed, this is being done on the 
basis of policies with criteria for selective nontreatment for potentially \ 
lethal defects which would otherwise be treated in normal babies. 
One pattern of reasoning underlying a specific policy of selective 
nontreatment of babies suffering from spina bifida with myelomen-
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ingocele merits particular attention and debate, if not critique. The 
pattern of reasoning, not the specific policy proposals, is the focus of 
attention here . 
Dr. John Lorber is widely known for his forthright and clear posi-
tions on the treatment of myelomeningocele and associated multi-
system defects. The criteria he now uses to select babies for non treat-
ment are also widely known and quite as widely debated. A number of 
hospitals have adopted his or similar criteria. Others have not. 
What is under scrutiny here is the reasoning he employs to face the 
results of vigorously applying his criteria of selection. One of the 
results is that some babies die who would otherwise have reached the 
levels of intelligence necessary to the levels of communication and 
human life mentioned earlier. 
It m ay be feared that selection fo r treatment may lead to the early dea th 
of an infant who has at least a chance of normal intellectual development. 
The data presented here indicate that with modern advances in treatment 
this is possible in a minority of even the most severely afflicted infants. 
Twenty percent of all 110 infa nts with major adverse criteria at birth were 
of normal intellectual development at 2·4 years of age, though all have 
severe physical handicaps and their life expectation is short. 13 
Allowing such infants to die is worthy of debate, has been and will 
continue to be debated . However, it is the reasoning in favor of 
permitting these results which calls for inquiry here. 
The first statement of this reasoning follows immediately upon the 
above quotation: "It must be remembered that, after early childhood, 
the suffering of a person with such severe physical defects and so few 
j ' opportunities in life is likely to be greater in those with normal intel-
ligence." 14 
Dr. Lorber amplifies on this reminder in his 1975 Milroy Lecture : 
"Using our criteria, some children who would have survived with 
normal intelligence will be excluded from treatment and will die. 
Nevertheless, it is my experience, as it is that of psychologists, social 
workers, teachers, and parents, that those young people who are 
severely handicapped by multi-system defects suffer far more if they 
have normal intelligence than if they are retarded. Only the intelligent 
realize fully what they have been through, what they have missed and 
will miss. Only the intelligent will worry about the frustrations of 
employment, loneliness, lack of opportunity and of normal family 
life. Only they will worry about their future and who will look after 
them when their parents are too old or are no longer alive." 15 
This reasoning represents a level of paternalism which is insufferable \ 
and merits the sharpest rejection. The entire thrust of our admittedly 
unevenly developing civilization, has been to assure that individual 
human beings have the chance to work out and master their own 
personal destinies. We have a position here which says that medicine is 
justified in determining that the working out of some destinies will be 
February, 1982 69 
too difficult for some persons. Before they have the chance and before .. 
they have to face their challenges, they may be left untreated and I 
allowed to die. 
This is the sort of hubris which casts a pall of suspicion over even 
the very justifiable instances of selective nontreatment. And a judg-
ment in favor of not treating a given infant can be ethically justified. 
Ethically justifiable guidelines for selective nontreatment can be estab-
lished, as will be indicated below. 
From Selective Nontreatment to Euthanasia 
It is clear that nontreatment, especially the radical non treatment 
advocated by Dr. John Lorber over the past few years, generally 
means death for the baby. However, death does not always come 
quickly. In fact, these babies may frequently linger for quite awhile. 
So Dr. John Freeman asks the medical profession and the general 
public, "Is there a right to die - quickly?" 16 
With respect to the decision for selective nontreatment the ques-
tion, more specifically, is: 
If we make that decision for a given child, should we not then, as physi-
cians, also have the opportunity to alleviate the pain and suffering by 
accelerating that death? ... In those rare instances where the decision has 
been made to avoid "heroic" measures and to allow "nature to take its 
course," should society not allow physicians to alleviate the pain and suffer-
ing and help nature to take its course - quickly? 17 
Dr. Freeman is quite aware that his question, affirmatively 
answered, implies a conversion from passive euthanasia to active 
euthanasia. Though he believes this conversion "is not an easy one for 
society or for the individual physicians faced with the decisions and 
with their consequences," he also holds that society and medicine 
should stop "perpetuating the fiction that withholding treatment is 
ethically different from terminating life. It is time that society began 
to discuss mechanisms by which we can alleviate the pain and suffer-
ing for those individuals whom we cannot help." 18 
Dr. Freeman has raised a question, taken a position and issued a 
plea. We shall return to these below. 
This paper opened with a quotation of Glanville Williams that 
proposals for humanitarian infanticide could, at the time of his writ-
ing, be dismissed as politically insignificant. This is no longer the case. 
Decisions not to treat babies and to allow them to die are now being 
made on a regular basis in hospitals with respect to babies who have 
genuine chances for human development. A body of thought which is 
also emerging to support these decisions and to prepare the way for a 
still more active and direct termination of the lives of these babies, 
works with four fundamental concepts and assumptions: 
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1) If we cannot prognosticate a future life of sufficient quality for 
a baby, then this life need not be preserved. 
2) If a baby, despite the possibility of achieving significant levels of 
human development, will foreseeably have great burdens of pain 
and suffering to endure, then we need not - some will argue, 
should not - preserve this baby's life. 
3) Decisions with respect to treatment or nontreatment of severely 
defective newborns will be less difficult and more efficient once 
we accept the doubtful or certain nonhuman status of these 
babies. 
4) Humanitarian infanticide, i.e., directly, swiftly and painlessly 
killing a seriously defective newborn when we have decided, 
perhaps justifiably, not to treat may at times be the most 
humane thing to do. 
Admittedly, many who would accept 1) and 2) would not be 
prepared to accept 3) and 4). 
A clarification of oversights and a sharp drawing of lines with 
respect to these four assumptions and to their implications is 
obviously necessary. We now turn to the sketch of an ethical argument 
and several ethical positions on the care of the severely defective 
newborn. 
The Severely Defective Newborn -
Selective Nontreatment, Quality of Life and Euthanasia: 
The Outlines of an Ethical Argument 
We shall state below that ethical argument is not sufficient to assure 
a social policy of care for defective newborns which will be consonant 
with the highest canons and ideals of Western civilization. Never-
theless, clear, sharp and profound ethical argument, though not suffi-
cient of itself, is absolutely indispensable. What follows is only an 
outline of how such an ethical argument should proceed. 
The Ethics of Selective N ontreatment 
1. The Situation 
Contemporary pediatric medicine is the scene of an increasingly 
intense debate centering on an issue which in its crudest and most 
unqualified form, lends itself to a paraphrasing of the logic Shakes-
peare captured so memorably: to treat or not to treat seriously defec-
tive newborn babies. At an earlier period, many or even most of these 
babies would simply have died, indeed, quite quickly. Because little 
could then be done, little had to be decided. 
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That is not where we are today. Medicine has advanced. Much more 
can now be done. Many of these babies now need not die as a direct 
and quick result of their defects at birth. Their lives can be "saved" or 
at least prolonged for a very significant period. Of course, in so many 
of these cases, the babies remain severely handicapped. And so we ask 
whether what we can now medically do to these babies is really for 
them, i.e., in their favor and contributing to their well-being. What 
modern medicine can do for these babies so often seems far from 
being enough. 
Enough for what? It is most frequently enough to prolong their 
lives. But many - and this group begins with the parents of defective 
newborns as well as their doctors - feel that the lives salvaged will 
really not be worth living. So whether to treat these defective new-
borns very vigorously or not to treat them at all - and this most 
frequently means allowing the babies to die - has become a set of real 
alternatives. This set is real because both options are being taken and 
argued. The second option is being taken ever more frequently, it 
would seem, and argued ever more publicly. 
Thus, contemporary pediatric medicine questions the ethics of 
selective nontreatment of defective newborn babies. Most people 
familiar, whether in a casual or professional way, with the plight of 
defective newborns would not hold that all such babies should be left 
to die. Only some babies. But which ones, precisely? Of course some, 
perhaps many, would vigorously assert that no selection whatsoever 
should be made. All defective babies should be treated with every 
possible element in medicine's instrumentarium. Every effort to 
prolong every infant life should be made. On the contrary, those who 
hold this absolutist policy to be medically unwise and morally insensi-
tive are faced with the intricacies of devising effective and justifiable 
guidelines or, more specifically, criteria of selection - a tricky and 
often tragic business. 
The question of selective nontreatment necessarily raises a host of 
serious considerations. 
When total cures or restorations to significant levels of health are 
just possible, what is the function of medicine? To prolong biological 
life at all costs and for as long as possible? A debatable proposition. 
However, with a somewhat greater degree of nuance, is it not medi-
cine's function to aid human beings - babies, in our discussion - in 
every possible way to achieve those levels of development and achieve-
ment which are open to them, given and accepting the often highly 
impoverished physical and related mental conditions with which these 
babies have to begin their lives? 
Perhaps. In fact, it would seem so. But what if a baby's multi-
system defects are so severe that levels of development and achieve-
ment higher than those minimal biological ones already attained are 
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out of the question? Are medical interventions permitted, let alone 
mandatory, when their only foreseeable results can be to prolong a 
baby's fixation at a point of development short of anything we can 
agree to be humanly worthwhile? 
2. A Basic Consideration 
Life, biological life, is sacred, but not in abstraction from the other 
values and possibilities to which it is ordained. "Life" is, of course, a 
difficult word . But it surely seems to be the case that any level of life 
is associated with a level of communication of some sort. At the 
lowest levels, life is associated with levels and complexities of chemical 
and biochemical exchange, communication and transformation. Every 
communication affects a transformation of a definite sort. At some of 
the highest levels of life - the ones we call human - another pattern 
of communication dominates and quite a different kind of transfor-
mation takes place. Promises, commitments, encouragements, esteem, 
genuine declarations of support, affection, friendship and love are 
given, accepted. Bonds are forged. Transformations of the high order 
we call interpersonal are achieved. 
3. A Position 
The basis for selecting babies for nontreatment has a great deal to 
do with whether we should make any distinctions whatsoever as to 
whether certain babies should be treated medically, others not treated 
and allowed to die. On the basis of rights, no distinctions should or 
1', can be morally justified. However, on the basis of chances for develop-
ment, distinctions and selections grounded in judgments as to what 
medical treatment is really doing or failing to do for defective babies 
may well be an imperative of medical and ethical responsibility. 
To withhold treatment from an infant who has a chance, albeit a 
fighting chance, of reaching the levels of life, the levels of communica-
tion and transformation mentioned above, is to make a drastically 
mistaken value judgment. In fact, many very severely defective 
newborns have gone on to reach these levels of human life and they 
have transformed the lives of many around them, partly because of 
the transformation which took place within themselves. Others, one 
could say, have not. They have lived miserable lives, plagued by 
depression and frustration. 
However, the same "differentials of happiness" apply to the 
community of those born normal and without severe defect. To judge 
that an infant should not be treated, should be allowed to die, because 
of the obstacles he will have to face or even because of our assessment 
of the likelihood of his not being able to master these obstacles and 
achieve the human transformation mentioned above, is indeed to cease 
practicing medicine in favor of playing God. 
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4. An Overview 
The ethics of selective non treatment begin to take shape with refer-
ence to the following canons of medical practice. 
Canon 1 
The first canon would dictate that when medicine cannot cure , i.e., 
cannot restore the patient to full and normal functioning, its equally 
fundamental purpose is to aid the patient in every therapeutic way to 
live with his disability, i.e., to develop personally as fully as possible 
despite and with this disability . Medicine stands in the service of 
nature to the extent that it can unfold and develop. 
Canon 2 
To assure happiness and to eliminate suffering from the lives of 
human beings goes beyond the functions and competence of medicine. 
Medicine has a far-reaching contribution to make in restoring and 
buttressing so many of the conditions required for the kind of devel-
opment a person needs to attain happiness. That attainment neces-
sarily encompasses the ability to integrate varying degrees and modal-
ities of suffering into the whole fabric of one's person and life. But 
this integration is the achievement of autonomous, free persons. It is 
also, as is everything of human worth, partially the gift we receive 
from the people we believe in, trust and love. This is the human 
drama. It is not medicine's function to close that drama in the first 
act. 
Canon 3 
The third canon deals more explicitly with the limits of medicine. 
When biological damage is so extensive that curative, restorative, and 
corrective medical interventions cannot aid the patient's development 
but only succeed in perpetuating or prolonging a patient's fixation at a 
level of development which is not meant to be final and is far short of 
the variety of purposes and levels of life to which biological human 
life is ordained - when this obtains, then , so the canon states, medical 
intervention has reached its limits, works contrary to its calling in 
perpetuating such fixations, and should not be employed. 
Canon 4 
There is a critical and decisive difference between humanely killing 
when we cannot cure and withholding medical treatment when the 
purposes of that treatment cannot be obtained . The latter represents a 
responsible acceptance of medicine's limits. The former assumes an 
extent of responsibility which cannot be justified. The premise for a 
logic of human infanticide is false and the conclusion of that logic 
over time would be unbearable. 
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5. Conclusion 
These canons, combined with the central point made above about 
the ordination of biological life to higher purposes and values, permit 
- at times demand - judgments for the nontreatment of certain 
severely defective newborns and for allowing them to die. These 
reflections do not assume that anyone can judge that someone else's 
life is not worth living. What they do accept is that some lives cannot 
be lived. 
Ethical Reflections on Euthanasia and Humanitarian Infanticide 
As mentioned earlier, Dr. Freeman has raised a question, taken a 
position and issued a plea with respect to the justifiability of humani-
tarian infanticide, of active euthanasia, for certain categories of defec-
tive newborns. 
The plea is for a discussion of mechanisms to alleviate the pain and 
suffering of those individuals we cannot cure. The language is soft, but 
what is being sought is clearly societal approval for doctors to hasten 
the death or even more quickly terminate the lives of those babies 
medicine cannot cure. The individuals in our present discussion are 
babies, severely defective newborns. 
The assumption behind this plea would seem to be that modern 
medicine cannot effectively alleviate the pain of incurable, severely 
defective newborns without killing them. We are being asked to accept 
"putting them out of their misery" as the only available alternative to 
leaving those babies in pain once we have, perhaps justifiably, decided 
to leave them untreated for specific kinds of defect. 
This assumption - and there may be other assumptions behind the 
plea - merits simple rejection. It is simply false. Modern medicine can 
alleviate and control the pain these babies would otherwise have to 
bear. It can do so effectively without killing them. This is, at least, the 
view of a special panel appointed by the Board of Science and Educa-
tion of the British Medical Association to study the problem of 
euthanasia. 
For those who are dying from painful conditions, doctors can and do 
provide relief by means of analgesic drugs .... It is possible to give opiates 
to ease pain for many weeks or months, without killing the patient. Newer 
drugs may increase the margin of safety, but the skillful use of older 
remedies can still provide satisfactory treatment. Sleep and freedom from 
pain can be achieved by modern therapeutic measure. 19 
Killing incurable and severely defective newborns to control and 
alleviate their pain is absolutely unnecessary and for that reason, as 
well as many others, utterly unjustifiable. 
A similar reflection is in order with respect to accelerating a baby's 
death. If the pain can be controlled, then no measures designed specif-
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ically to accelerate the baby's death are ethically or medically accept-
able. If a hastening of death comes about as a by-product of drugs 
administered in sufficient dosages to alleviate pain, one cannot speak 
of euthanasia or of accelerating the baby's death or of having killed 
the baby. This language would be in demand with respect to an admin-
istration of analgesics or sedatives in doses greater than those required 
to relieve pain. "The administration of those dosages required to 
relieve pain belongs to the sphere of actions that are an integral part of 
living and is not an overdose termination of life. The death of a 
patient in these circumstances simply means that his diseased or 
deteriorated or deteriorating physical condition can no longer support 
the activities which are an integral part of living." 
If a baby's pain can be alleviated with doses of analgesics which do 
not kill him or accelerate his death, then the administration of higher 
dosages must have some other motivation and this motivation should 
be openly declared, identified, and justified. This paper argues that 
procedures specifically designed to accelerate the baby's death are not 
necessary to alleviate pain and, for this reason as well as others, are 
unjustifiable. 
One may seriously question, however, whether the alleviation of 
these babies' pain is the really determining motivation behind a plea 
for societal approval of mechanisms which would be equivalent to an 
approval of killing these babies. Mention has also been made of suffer-
ing. Whose? The baby's? Do babies really suffer, over and above the 
experience of pain which, let it be emphasized again, can be alleviated 
and controlled? 
Suffering involves more than the neurological experience of pain. 
Suffering involves the perception of a terrible gap between what is and 
what should or could have been the case with respect to one's own or 
someone else's life. Babies do not suffer in this sense. But adults can 
and all too frequently do suffer in this sense. One suspects that both 
parents and doctors must suffer when they look upon a baby lingering 
on through a dying curve after they have decided, perhaps justifiably, 
to withhold medical treatment for specific defect from this baby. 
If the decision to withhold treatment has been short-sighted, 
motivated by a distorted sense of human values, in short, has been 
unjustified, then full treatment of the infant, not killing the infant or 
accelerating his death, is in demand and utterly imperative. If, on the 
other hand, a nontreatment decision is justifiable, then the only really 
justifiable subsequent behavior toward the infant will consist of allevi-
ating the baby's pain and caring for him with love as we, perhaps with 
courage and mutual support, suffer this baby's demise and the limita-
tions of our own powers to cure and renew life. Accelerating the 
infant's death or killing the infant is an unacceptable way of escaping 
the suffering we, not the baby, are called upon to bear. 




Dr. Freeman has also taken a position. He believes that ethical 
differences between withholding treatment and directly terminating 
life are simply fictional. There are no real ethical differences, at least 
nothing decisively different, between withholding treatment when we 
cannot cure and killing once we have decided to withhold treatment. 
This is Freeman's claim. 
Of course, if one focuses exclusively on the defective newborn and 
upon his life span, there is indeed little difference between killing the 
infant, accelerating his death, and allowing him to die after a decision 
for nontreatment. In most cases the life span difference is reduced to a 
matter of days or several weeks. 
But Freeman's position centers on ethical differences. Such differ-
ences have to do primarily with the canons of our responsibility vis a 
vis these newborns, with the canons of our responsibility and with our 
mandate of care. On this level, at least - not exclusively, there are 
utterly crucial ethical differences between withholding treatment and 
"humanitarian infanticide." 
One of these differences is defined with respect to those who do 
the withholding or the killing. When we withhold treatment from 
defective babies because we cannot cure them and because treatment 
would.,at bottom signify our initiative in prolonging a dying process or 
in fixing a baby at a biological stage of development he is meant to 
transcend, then we admit the limits of what we are able to do 
medically for this child. We at the same time admit the ethical limits 
of what we should do to this child. 
When we kill such a baby, we assume a mandate to eliminate suffer-
ing by eliminating the sufferer. This mandate assumes a total power 
and dominion over the sufferer because it assumes a total responsibil-
ity for the sufferer's life. The least that can be said for such a mandate 
is that it carries the burden of its proof. The next thing to be said is 
that such a mandate requires justification. The existence of such a 
mandate has to be demonstrated. 
However, the demonstration that medicine has such a total man-
date has never been delivered. In fact, the cardinal beliefs and posi-
tions of Western civilized thought on the uniqueness and autonomy of 
every individual human being have consistently rejected the totalitar-
ian premises of such a mandate. If there are technical limits on what 
we can effectively do medically for a defective newborn, there are also 
definite ethical limits on what we can ethically do to such a child in 
his own name and on the basis of our interpretation of what is in his 
own best interests. 
It is the premise for humanitarian infanticide which is rejected 
here. The premise is admittedly complex in structure. It would, among 
other things, hold that: 
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when we cannot cure, we may kill to eliminate suffering; 
suffering is a problem which can and has to be technically 
solved; 
medicine is responsible for delivering this technical solution to 
the problem of suffering with respect to those who cannot be 
cured; 
there are no limits to medicine's mandate to intervene in a 
human life. 
This totalitarian view of medical responsibility is a determinant of 
the plea for humanitarian infanticide. This is the concept we empha-
size for the moment as meriting rejection and a 360 degree transfor-
mation. The premise for medical practice should be that we intervene 
as little as possible in any human life. Every such intervention has to 
be justified, even if this justification is usually smoothly implied in the 
initial contacts which establish a given doctor-patient relationship. 
Decisions for non treatment may, in a range of circumstances, 
signify precisely a respect for this fundamental principle, the 
combined principle of individual autonomy and human interdepen-
dence. What is intolerable is that a further step and a further interven-
tion - the step of humanitarian infanticide, which claims a totality of 
responsibility and an absolute imperative to intervene - are the very 
points denied by the non treatment decision. In a word, the pattern of 
reasoning which links nontreatment decisions in medicine with a plea 
for humanitarian infanticide suffers from a profound and intolerable 
contradiction. This contradiction centers on the limits of medicine's 
responsibility and medicine's mandate. 
If the premise for humanitarian infanticide has to be rejected, we i 
must also emphasize that the logic set up by this premise would 
permit a societal conclusion which would, over time, be absolutely 
intolerable. There are many kinds of suffering and there are sufferers 
of all ages. If we assume a mandate to kill one group of sufferers to 
eliminate their pain, how can we in a non-arbitrary fashion stipulate 
that other groups of sufferers may not be killed to relieve them of 
their suffering? If we have no non-arbitrary canons to govern "human-
itarian killing," then limitations on this peculiar mode of benevolence 
will indeed be arbitrary and subject to removal by those who mean 
well toward other patients, just as pleaders for humanitarian infanti-
cide mean well for the incurable and defective newborns. 
Conclusion 
These reflections are only the beginning of an argument which must 
end with a rejection of the position Freeman has taken. There are 
ethically critical differences between withholding treatment when we 
cannot cure and killing when we know we should not treat. When 
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these differences are ignored, decisions beginning in benevolence will 
end in a most terrible despotism of the healthy over the weak and 
incurable. 
For these reasons and others still calling for development, it would 
seem necessary to answer Dr. Freeman's question as to the justifiabil-
ity of active euthanasia with an unqualified negative. 
From Ethical Argument to Existential Demonstration 
that Care of Defective Newborns Is Possible 
We no longer live in a society which is culturally, philosophically, 
religiously, or ethically homogeneous. In a society which is, homo-
geneity settles many issues. Debate is unnecessary. Consensus is a 
given, however fragile this consensus may become at a later date. In a 
society as pluralistic as our own, careful, ongoing debate is essential to 
preserve the fabric of fellowship necessary to preserve and enhance the 
most cherished ideals of our civilization. 
The point of debate, of course, is to search for consensus, at least 
until the nondebatable roots of basic beliefs and their conflicts are laid 
bare. And then what? Can we reach consensus in policy without a 
consensus in belief, for example, on what is really humanly worth-
while? On what is humanly really most important? And if we in our 
society do not at the moment agree on what is humanly worthwhile, 
what do we then do? We must come to realize that a point is reached 
when argumentation and debate have to give way to a richer existen-
I , tial demonstration of our beliefs and corresponding ethical positions. 
This existential demonstration is absolutely essential to give body 
and credibility to our ethical argument that the defective, weak, 
retarded and suffering can be loved into a life which is worthwhile. 
Correct ethical positions are not enough. We have to demonstrate 
realistically that these positions can be lived. 
This demonstration will certainly demand the imaginative creation 
of new ways of caring for those we cannot cure. This is the moment 
for the Christian churches, for the Roman Catholic Church, to 
demand the establishment, tor example, at a new order, a new com-
munity to specifically and effectively care for all those whom others 
in our society consider as candidates for euthanasia. 
There is a crying need for such an order, for there are many defec-
tive, disabled and handicapped babies and persons. Many families 
cannot, in fact, bear the burden of caring for these babies. Were we to 
succeed in establishing such an order - and I cite this as only one 
example of what we, the Church, should be doing - we would not 
only be caring for those in the most dire need, but would also be 
creating a living proof and symbol in our society that euthanasia is not 
necessary. In the process, we would also be demonstrating that Chris-
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tian belief makes a difference and gives a definite shape to a society. 
As a byproduct we would gradually have to spend less time running 
around asking why people, young people, are leaving the Church. 
Over the past few years, I have strongly argued the case for care and 
treatment of defective babies whenever there is hope for development. 
What we must realize is that neonatal medical treatment is only the 
beginning of the care these babies will need, probably all their lives. 
Are we ready, as Christians, to effectively demonstrate that this care 
can and will be given? 
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